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This study analyzes the minimum quality standard set by the European
Union (EU) through Regulation 1371/2007 of Rail Passengers’ Rights and
Obligations. A welfare maximizing quality standard raises quality and con-
sumer satisfaction, but does not improve the modal split of rail transport.
A minimum quality standard determined by political majorities may or may
not increase welfare. However, all binding standards induce travelers to
switch to transport modes with higher anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
Keywords: regulation; minimum quality standards; median; rail
JEL: L51; L92; D72
1 Introduction
On the 3 December, 2007 a regulation on rail passengers’ rights and obligations
was published in the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union. The regulation
contained rules regarding delays, missed trains, and train cancellations, to improve
the quality. For example, the minimal compensation for a delay of 60 to 119
minutes was set at 25% of the ticket price. All quality regulations had to be
implemented by Member States till the 3 December 2009. The objective mentioned
in the preamble was “to help increase the share of rail transport in relation to other
modes of transport” (European Union, 2007, p. 14). The transportation sector is
TU Braunschweig, Economics Department, Spielmannstr. 9, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany
1one of the main sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and an increased
modal split of the railway sector may reduce CO2 emissions. A sample-rail-trip
from Berlin to Paris produces 33 kg carbon dioxide per passenger compared to
115.4 kg per passenger for the same trip by car, or 203.5 kg by air.1 However,
a consumer survey for the European Commission reveals that consumers are not
satisﬁed with rail transport. Rail is the only transport mode by which less than
50% of the respondents are satisﬁed. Furthermore, about 25% of the respondents
have experienced problems with this service in the last 12 months. In contrast, only
about 15% of the respondents have had problems with new motor vehicles or air
transport (Eurostat, 2009). Therefore, it seems obvious that a quality regulation
is an appropriate policy to increase the modal share of rail transport.
It is well known that a monopolist may undersupply quality. In most EU-
member countries the market for rail passenger transport is still highly concen-
trated. Companies, aside from the incumbent, that is, the former monopolist, have
hardly more than 10% of the market share (European Commission, 2009). For a
given quantity of supply, the monopolist undersupplies quality if the average val-
uation of quality is higher than the valuation of the marginal consumer, because
the welfare optimum is given by averages, but prices signal marginal valuations
(Spence, 1975; Sheshinski, 1976). Therefore, the market power of incumbents is
likely to be the cause of low satisfaction and a quality regulation might solve this
problem.
There are many dimensions of quality in rail transport (Nathanail, 2008): sys-
tem safety, cleanliness, passenger comfort, servicing, such as, frequency of service
and speed, passenger information, and itinerary accuracy. Furthermore, consumers
have diﬀerent preferences in this multidimensional quality space (Lyons et al., 2007;
Teichert et al., 2008; Bhadra, 2009). Punctuality is more important for short dis-
tance than for long distance travel. The willingness to pay for speed increases with
the opportunity costs of time and therefore business travelers have a higher willing-
ness than travelers visiting friends and relatives or holiday travelers. Commuters
value high frequency and punctuality much more than travelers visiting friends
and relatives or holiday travelers. To summarize, the regulation of one dimension
of quality, itinerary accuracy, aﬀects diﬀerent types of consumers diﬀerently.
The eﬀects of minimum quality standards when consumers are heterogeneous
are complex (Sappington, 2005). Besanko et al. (1987) show that a monopolist
that sells in a market in which consumers diﬀer in their willingness to pay for
quality will distort and enhance the range of products oﬀered for sale. A minimum
quality standard will result in the exclusion of consumers from the market, relative
to the unregulated equilibrium, whereas, in general the eﬀect on social welfare
1Values according to www.ecopassenger.org where emissions for individual travel routes are
computable.
2is ambiguous. Kluger (1989) shows that a minimum quality standard alters the
entire price and quality schedule oﬀered by a monopolist. However, there are many
reasons why transport ﬁrms do not oﬀer a full range of punctuality qualities, except
one. This article shows that exclusion of consumers occurs even if the monopolist
has to oﬀer only one type of quality. Furthermore, the eﬀects of the standard
on social welfare are determined in our article. Leland (1979) considers a market
with asymmetric information concerning quality. In public transport by train there
may be no information about the expected arrival time, but there is no systematic
asymmetric information about punctuality. Most of the data is available through
the net and consumers do know what quality a rail ﬁrm oﬀers. Besanko et al.
(1988) consider a monopolist who is not able to observe the consumers’ preferences
for product quality and show that a rate of return regulation may counteract
the quality distortion. However, in the European Union (EU) we do not have a
regulation for rail transport ﬁrms, but we have a process of transforming state-
owned ﬁrms to proﬁt-oriented ﬁrms. We therefore consider proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
facing minimum quality standards. Sibly (2009) raises a question similar to our
problem. However, his result states that if there are two types of customers for
public transport, the quality of the public transport system is downwardly skewed,
which is the starting point of our analysis.
This article shows that even though there is an undersupply of quality in the
market for rail transport and quality regulation raises quality and consumer sat-
isfaction, the resulting policy does not improve the modal split. Furthermore, if
the minimum level of quality is not the result of a benevolent welfare maximizing
dictator, but the result of pressure group politics, the regulation is only coinciden-
tally welfare optimal. The outcome depends on the power of railway companies
on the one side and consumer pressure groups on the other side. We show that
in case railway companies have little inﬂuence on the decision-making process and
democratic ballots in the group of rail users solely determine the quality regula-
tion, then welfare decreases. The reason for these non-intended perverse eﬀects
is that even though all consumers prefer a higher quality the willingness to pay
for quality diﬀers between consumers. Whereas the monopolist uses the market
power and the higher quality to increase the price, some consumers do not think
the rise in quality justiﬁes the higher price, and therefore, quit using the train.
Furthermore, non-rail users do not even vote if the ballot is about regulating rail
transport. Voter abstinence aggravates quality distortion. A quality regulation
will not increase the mode share of rail transport.
32 The model
Following Besanko et al. (1987), we assume that railway transport can be produced
in a continuous array of quality levels, or punctuality, denoted by q, where q 2
[0;1). There are constant unit costs C(q) with C(0) = 0, C0(q) > 0, and C00 > 0.
For simplicity:
C(q) =   q
2;
with  > 0, similar to Lambertini (2006, p.11). The monopolist can oﬀer only one
price / quality combination.2
Every consumer travels at most once per period of time and the number of
consumers is normalized to one. The consumer’s utility is approximated by: U =
y +V (q;) with V 0(q) > 0 and V 00 < 0 , where y is a composite commodity and V
is the total willingness to pay for quality (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978).
We use  as the parameter capturing the consumers’ heterogenous preferences
for quality. There are travelers visiting friends and relatives and holiday travelers,
which have a small , because they have weak preferences for punctuality. How-
ever, there are also commuters, who value punctuality much more than travelers
visiting friends and relatives or holiday travelers. These commuters have a high
. Business travelers have a medium preference for punctuality, because speed is
more important. Therefore, they are represented by a medium . In our model 
is equally distributed over an interval [0;1]. To model the diversity of consumers




W , which is trivially fulﬁlled for 0 = 0
and guarantees a demand smaller than one.
For every type of consumer willingness to pay for quality V increases as quality
increases, but with a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we assume that the total and
marginal willingness to pay for quality increases in the taste parameter. A simple




A consumer of taste type  buys if
p
q  p. The consumer ~  = p2=q is
indiﬀerent to buying. Consequently, all consumers ~     1 buy, and therefore,
demand equals
D(p;q) =






if p2=q < 1 and zero otherwise. The demand function fulﬁlls the law of demand.
With regard to quality, the demand increases as quality increases. Therefore, ig-
noring any other reactions a quality increase through a regulation increases the
2 is the costs per passenger unit at quality normalized to one and we assume constant returns
to scale, i.e. constant unit costs on the technical side independent of quality.
4share of rail transport, as indicated in the EU regulation. Note also that this
demand function is nonlinear with respect to price. If demand was linear a mo-
nopolist would distort the price only because nonlinearity is a necessary condition
for quality distortion (Spence, 1975).
2.1 Welfare optimum
As a benchmark the combination of price and quality (Point W in Figure 1) that













































The monopolist undersupplies quality because the quantity restriction is severe
(Spence, 1975). A simple comparison of the monopolist’s quality and the wel-
fare maximizing quality could induce the ambition to increase quality in order to
improve welfare.
3 Regulation of quality
Although there are a variety of possible modes of regulation, this article analyzes
the minimum quality standards as set by the European Union. Therefore, we
consider only the case where the policy maker decides the quality and the mo-
nopolist then decides on the optimal price. Therefore, the policy maker acts as a
Stackelberg-leader.




















Anticipating the increase in price on quality standards, the regulator maximizes
welfare by setting the quality to





As the regulator only sets the quality, but not the price, the monopolist is able
to increase the price to





The price increase in turn leads to an exclusion of market participants:




To summarize, a welfare maximizing regulation enhances quality and improves
welfare (Point R in Figure 1). However, the regulation decreases the modal share
of the rail sector and is no measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions if travelers
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Figure 1: Prices and qualities in diﬀerent regulatory regimes
64 Political Regulation
In a two party system the quality regulation policies of the parties converge to the
policy preferred by the median voter, if every citizen votes, because preferences

































is negative because 1=0 > 1=W. In a ballot about quality regulation, a maxi-
mum quality standard (and not a minimum quality standard) outpolls the unreg-
ulated monopoly. Quality reduction results in a lower price, and voters with a low
willingness to pay for quality, which are the majority, beneﬁt.
However, the European Union did not decrease the quality, but increased it.
There are many reasons as to why the median voter’s preferred outcome is not
the outcome of the political process (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981), and absten-
tion from voting (Hinich and Ordeshook, 1969) is most important in the case of
passenger transport by rail. The regulation of quality of passenger transport ef-
fects consumers diﬀerently. Some consumers obtain a higher net-surplus through
the regulation. These are the consumers with high willingness to pay for quality,
such as business travelers, who vote in favor of the regulation. Consumers with
low willingness to pay for quality, such as holiday travelers and travelers visiting
friends and relatives, oppose the regulation. By establishing the regulation, a part
of these consumers are excluded from the market and are thus losing consumer
surplus. Furthermore, some consumers do not leave the market, but still have a
loss of surplus. Finally, there are potential consumers who do not even buy in the
low quality unregulated monopoly. As they do not receive any consumer surplus
they are indiﬀerent to the unregulated monopoly and minimum quality standards.
We assume, that these voters have no interest in the decision-making process and
abstain from the ballot. The eﬀect is called abstention from indiﬀerence (Hinich
and Ordeshook, 1969).
We assume the status quo of the non-regulated market. The median of the
current users increases his net-utility by claiming a higher quality. A political
agent has to follow this claim for higher quality in order to maximize his vote
7share by increasing the minimum standard of quality. As a result the monopolist
increases the price and even more consumers leave the market, changing the group
of remaining consumers. As a result, the median of the consumer group shifts
upward. As long as the median, after a quality increase, prefers an even higher
quality, a politician can improve his vote share by increasing the quality.
Consumers who do not use rail transport abstain from a ballot about quality
regulation in the rail sector. Furthermore, in the ballot only the votes cast are
valid, and therefore, the vote share is relevant. This assumption about voting
abstinence results in a quality qP that cannot be outvoted by a diﬀerent minimum
quality proposal. In the equilibrium, no quality change increases the share of
voters preferring the changed quality even though the change of consumers due to
the quality change is anticipated.
Two conditions determine the equilibrium (qP;P). First, for a given median M
the median voter theorem holds, which means the ballot winning quality maximizes
the net utility NU of the median voter:
NUM(qP)  NUM(q)8q:
Second, P has to be the median of consumers who travel by train if the quality
is qP.
To get the median voter for a given quality q we use the net utility of consumer
 for a given q. That is,
NU(q) =
p













3 + 31 + 2q
p
2q4 + 3q1):










receiving a net utility of
NUP(q) =
p







8Because qP maximizes NUP(q) we use the ﬁrst order condition to specify
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M(q)
qP(M)
Figure 2: Political Equilibrium
The quality demanded by the median of rail travelers is larger than the wel-
fare maximizing minimum quality standard as well as the quality oﬀered by the
unregulated monopolist. Furthermore, a regulation following the demands of rail
travelers decreases welfare even when compared to the unregulated monopoly. Last
but not least, this type of regulation decreases the modal share of the rail sector
and is the worst policy with regard to the greenhouse gas emissions.
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argue that regulation is not induced by a
benevolent welfare maximizing decision maker or by the median of voters, but by
pressure groups. Following Peltzman (1976) we consider two groups struggling to
inﬂuence the regulator, producers, that is, the railway company, and rail travelers.
Depending on the inﬂuence, the resulting regulatory policy is either qM, if only
the monopolist is important, or qP, if only voters count. However, in reality both
groups are important and the regulator chooses a quality from [qM;qP], such that
the marginal votes lost from consumers because of a lower quality are outweighed
by the votes (arguably indirectly) won from the railway company. Note that
9this implies that the competition of pressure groups may also lead to the welfare
optimal regulatory minimum quality standard qR (Becker, 1983).
To summarize, following Peltzman (1976), the decision-making process in the
European Union results in a minimum quality standard that is somewhere in
[qM;qP], and may or may not increase welfare. However, if there is no price or rate
of return regulation, a binding minimum standard of quality causes the monopolist
to raise prices, inducing consumers to quit traveling by rail. The substitution of the
ecological preferred transport mode by modes with higher emissions counteracts
the aim of the regulator to ﬁght anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
5 Conclusion
Within the scope of implementation of the EU Regulation of Passenger Rights
the member states have great latitude. On the one hand, the member states may
postpone parts of the regulation, especially the minimum quality standard for
itinerary accuracy, for up to 15 years. On the other hand, minimum standards are
not binding and member states are free to increase quality beyond the regulation.
In fact, passenger rights vary throughout the EU. According to our model this
variation of standards is a result of varying proportions of power among the group
of rail passengers and the rail monopolist.
Empirical research about the relation of pressure groups and the regulation
in the EU member states is necessary to test our hypothesis. As a benchmark
we refer to Switzerland, which is not part of the EU and therefore not aﬀected
by the regulation. For a direct democracy our model predicts a small quality
standard. Switzerland’s compensation payments are in line with the EU minimum
requirements.
Although the welfare eﬀect of the EU regulation is ambiguous, the regulatory
minimum quality standard decreases the share of rail transport in the model split.
Regulation of the monopolist’s pricing policy can prevent this unintentional ef-
fect if the regulated price does not increase, even if the quality increases. It is
well known that rate of return and price cap regulations can deter the railway
company from disproportionate price increases. Spence (1975) shows that a rate
of return regulation improves the quality provided by a monopolist if capital is
a factor of production. However, if some part of the quality is labor-using, the
rate of return regulation diminishes it. In a price-regulated market entry of new
companies induce incumbent companies to move quality in the welfare-maximizing
direction (Beil et al., 1995). Thus, encouraging entry into the rail passenger trans-
port market might be an option. Gal-Or (1983) demonstrates that in a market
without price regulation, entry might decrease average quality, but it increases the
aggregate output. To summarize, in order to increase the share of passenger rail
10transport in the modal split, a policy that creates competition is appropriate. As a
positive side eﬀect the inﬂuence of pressure groups is reduced. Furthermore, ﬁrms
have an incentive to produce diﬀerent qualities in an oligopolistic market (Motta,
1993; Shaked and Sutton, 1982), following which a minimum quality standard
might be a policy to increase welfare as well as to improve the model split (Ron-
nen, 1991). Moreover, diﬀerentiated qualities better ﬁt the needs of heterogeneous
customers.
To summarize, the pressure group’s inﬂuence on the minimum quality stan-
dards in the European Union, unintentionally decrease the rail transport share.
To increase the quality options for travelers and to reduce anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions a noteworthy alternative is a policy to support entry into the
rail passenger transport market. Increased competition reduces the inﬂuence of
pressure groups and might induce the production of diﬀerentiated qualities. As
entry also increases the output, more passengers will use trains instead of other
transport modes with higher emissions. Encouraging new ﬁrms to enter the mar-
ket for passenger transport by rail and supporting competition is, compared to a
regulation of quality, a superior policy to ﬁght global warming.
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11by using the ﬁrst order conditions
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